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COMMENT

BUCKING THE TREND: WHY MARYLAND DOES NOT
NEED AN EQUINE ACTIVITY STATUTE AND WHY IT MAY
BE TIME TO PUT ALL OF THESE STATUTES OUT TO
PASTURE
By: Jennifer Dietrich Merryman
There is substantial misconception among horsemen as to the
protection afforded by equine activity statutes and whether these
statutes currently have an effect on procuring insurance and reducing
insurance rates. l Every few years, Maryland legislators introduce an
equine limited liability bill in response to constituent pressure. 2 The
Maryland horse community is concerned with how best to protect and
promote the local horse industry. Based on the horse industry's
economic impact, these are admirable goals. This local industry has
an annual economic impact of $1.5 billion, and employs over 20,000
people. 3
Although the demand for horse related activities is high, so is the
risk of injury to people. Horses weigh in excess of 1,000 pounds and
can travel up to 35 miles per hour. Horses are unpredictable and as a
herd animal, they are endowed with a very strong flight instinct that
can be triggered at any moment. Needless to say, horse related
injuries are often severe.
An equine activity statute4 is designed to provide limited immunity
to the horse professional and equine activity sponsors from lawsuits
stemming from horse related injuries. 5 Prior the establishment of
comparative negligence theory, most states applied the common law

1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

E-mail from Crystal Brumme Kimball, Secretary, Maryland Steeple Chase Association to
Jennifer Merryman (June 1,2005 12:44 P.M. EST) (on file with author).
ld.
Maryland Department of Agriculture, Maryland Horse Industry Board,
http://www.marylandhorseindustry.org/pdffiles/CensusBrochure.pdf.
See
also
http://www.horse council.org (holding that nationwide, the horse industry supports 1.4
million jobs and pays over $2 billion in taxes).
The author uses the terms equine limited liability statute and equine activity statute
interchangeab Iy.
See, e.g. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 4.24.540 (West 2005).
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doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk6 , both of
which acted to protect the defendant from liability. Assumption of
risk came into play when the plaintiff knowingly agreed to bear the
responsibility of a certain risk or risks. 7 Contributory negligence
barred a plaintiff even when his or her injury was minuscule. 8
Eventually, most states changed to a comparative fault system because
it was considered more equitable than the common law fault system
that allowed for contributory negligence. 9 To address the role
assumption of risk played within a comparative negligence regime,
high risk sports statutes, including equine statutes, were created to
unequivocally establish assumption of risk in specific situations. lo
However, it makes more sense to develop a sound framework of
general tort principles instead of having various sport specific
statutes. II A global view based on primary implied assumption of risk
obviates the need for legislative re-establishment of assumption of
risk. The utility of primary implied assumption of risk is that it does
not require legislative bodies to foresee the myriad of activities in
which a person may voluntarily and enthusiastically engage. Under
such a system, a person who voluntarily participates in a recreational
activity or sport should not be able to sue for being injured by a risk
that cannot be eliminated from the sport.
Part I of this comment will show the impetus behind equine activity
statutes. Part II will show why the need for equine statutes no longer
exists based on the doctrine of primary implied assumption of risk.
Lastly, Part III will survey Maryland law to show that Maryland will
not benefit from an equine activity statute and therefore should not
adopt one.

6.

VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, § 1.01 (4th ed. LexisNexis 2002).
Infra note 16.
8. ld.
9. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6 at §22.02, § 100.
10. Infra note 14.
11. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
207,208.

7.

2006]

Maryland Does Not Need An Equine Activity Statute

I.

IMPETUS BEHIND EQUINE ACTIVITY STATUTES

A.

Common Law Assumption of Risk

135

The high risk of injury and the change in tort law were the main
driving forces behind equine protective statutes. 12 To understand why
equine limited liability laws came about, it is important to understand
how the evolution of fault systems l3 created a period of time when it
was unclear whether assumption of risk survived as a complete
defense. At the same time, many states had important economic
industries that evolved around high risk activities where accidents
were inevitable. 14 To provide immediate assistance to these industries,
legislators .enacted statutes establishing protection for specific
activities. 15
Traditionally, there were two complete defenses to negligence,
contributory negligence and assumption of risk, both of which acted to
bar a plaintiff from recovery.16 Scholars advocated for a comparative
negligence system for fairness reasons. In part, this view is premised
on the theory of loss distribution as a way to mitigate the perceived
harshness of contributory negligence. 17 Comparative negligence
operates by apportioning the costs of negligent acts on the basis of
fault. 18 In other words, using comparative negligence, the court
12. Terence J. Centner, The New Equine Liability Statutes, 62 TENN. L. REV. 997,998, 1002
(Summer 1995).
13. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6 (referring to fault systems as different laws that
operate to find liability when a duty has been breached).
14. John O. Spengler & Brian P. Burket, Sport Safety Statutes and Inherent Risk: A
Comparison Study of Sport Specific Legislation, 11 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 135, 135
(Spring/Summer 2001).
15. Id.; see, e.g. Amburgey v. Sauder, 605 N.W.2d 84, 93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
16. RICHARD 1. GILBERT & PAUL T. GILBERT, MD. TORT LAW HANDBOOK § 11.4, 11.6
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 3rd ed. Lexis Publishing 2000) (1986).
17. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6; 78 A.L.R 3d 339 § 2b (noting that comparative
negligence system stresses equitable distribution of losses in relation to the contribution
of the parties). Maryland is a common law state that recognizes contributory negligence
as a complete bar. In theory, the defense seems quite harsh. "Contributory negligence
bars recovery, theoretically at least, even though by comparison the negligence is
minuscule. In theory, if the defendant's negligence is 99.99% of the total negligence
comprising the incident, and the plaintiffs negligence is .01 %, the plaintiff is not, as a
matter of law, entitled to recover." MD. TORT LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 16 at § 11.4.1.
However, comments to the Maryland Jury Instructions suggest a more moderate
approach. For example, using the "more likely than not" standard when assessing
whether the plaintiffs contributory negligence was the proximate cause of his harm and
not allowing a jury instruction if the evidence amounts to nothing more than conjecture.
MD. Civ. Pattern Jury Instr. 19:11 cmt. 3(b)-(c) (2003).
18. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6 at § 2.01.
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divides up the damages between the parties when the plaintiffs
negligence has contributed to his injury.19 Therefore, in a comparative
negligence regime, a plaintiffs contributory negligence ceases to act
as a complete bar. Unfortunately, many of the peripheral issues
surrounding comparative negligence were not framed; in fact, it was
unclear whether assumption of risk survived a comparative negligence
regime. 20 The argument used to support this position hinged on the
idea that a system designed to distribute losses cannot allow an
absolute defense that precludes such losses from being distributed. 21
In the 1950's, a few states began changing to a comparative
negligence fault system?2 Between the 1960's and the 1970's, the
adoption of comparative fault by statute and judicial fiat surged. 23 By
1980, implied assumption of risk was virtually extinct. 24 This was
also an era of continuous expansion in tort liability theories in almost
every area of tort law. 25 Accordingly, the professional horseman
began to see an increase in insurance premiums and, in some
instances, the inability to procure insurance at al1. 26
Although dividing damages based on fault assignments is equitable
in theory, it can assign fault to a defendant for risks that are an integral
part of a sport. 27 This is especially unfair when part of the attraction to
the sport is the risk itself. Therefore, even when an injurious outcome
is a collateral and customarily accepted facet of an activity, many
states lost the ability to deal with such cases as a matter of law. 28
Instead, assumption of risk became one of the factors when
apportioning fault. 29 By the mid-1980's, the legal community began to
recognize the moderating effect that common law assumption of risk
has on law suits, particularly with regard to sports and other
recreational activities. 3o
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id. at § 9.01 et seq.
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 68, 456-57 (4th ed. 1971).
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6 at § 1.0 I.
ld.
Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and Possible End of the Rise of Modern American
Tort, 26 GA. L. REV. 601,671 (Spring 1992).
Id. at 604 (suggesting there is a slow down recently, but it may be only a pause in what
could turn out to be a continuing rise in liability).
See Amburgey, supra note 15 at 93; see Centner, supra note 12 at 999.
But see Donald v. Triple SWell Serv., 708 So.2d 1318, 1325 (Miss. 1998) (noting a jury
may find 0% fault on causation).
See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6 at §§ 9.0 I (a)-9.04(a)(l), (b), (c).
!d. at § 9.04(b), (c)(3).
Ordway v. Superior Court of Orange County, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988);
Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964 (N.Y. 1986).
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There are many sports besides equestrian activities that have sport
specific limited liability statutes, for example, hockey, baseball,
outfitters, and skiing to name a few. 3l But if many comparative
negligence states recognize the no-duty theory of primary implied
assumption of risk,32 then it appears that these statutes, while once
probably necessary, have outlived their usefulness. Additionally, most
jurisdictions recognize a heightened standard of care when it comes to
personal injury resulting from voluntary participation in recreational
activities. 33 This means that the defendant's simple negligence or
carelessness is not enough to attach liability. The negligence must
reach a recklessness or gross standard. 34 This further bolsters the idea
that the need for these types of sport specific statutes may be over.
If the legislatures and lobbyists, insist on these types of statutes,
perhaps an omnibus recreational statute addressing sports and
recreational activities in general would be more appropriate. But
whether or not such a statute would provide better protection for the
organizers and providers of recreational activities is debatable. For
example, an omnibus statute, including a general provision and sport
specific subsections containing comprehensive lists of the inherent
risks in each sport, raises the question of how realistic is it to outline
every single risk or contingency.35 Alternatively, if the omnibus sports
statute only has a general provision for inherent risks, the judge would
make a determination, based on the facts of the case, whether or not

31. Terence J. Centner, ModifYing Negligence Law for Equine Activities in Arkansas: A New
Good Samaritan Paradigm for Equine Activity Sponsors, 50 ARK. L. REV. 637, 642
(1998).
32. See, e.g. Howell v. Clyde, 620 A.2d 1107, 1112 (Pa. 1993); Stanton v. Miller, 583
N.E.2d 1080, 1081 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing no-duty theory but distinguishing
primary assumption of risk from implied assumption of risk); Chapman v. Craig, 431
N.W.2d 770, 771 (Iowa 1988) (referring only to primary assumption of risk). See
Alexander J. Drago, Assumption of Risk: An Age-Old Defense Still Viable in Sports and
Recreation Cases, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 583, 590, (Winter,
2002).
33. Kelly v. Mccarrick, 155 Md. 82, 101, 841 A.2d 869, 880 (2004) (citing Stanley L.
Grazis, Liability of Participant in Team Athletic Competition for Injury to or Death of
Another Participant, 55 A.L.R. 5th 529, *2 (1998 2003 Supp.); Crawn v. Campo, 643
A.2d 600, 603 (citing Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 716 (Cal. 1992))).
34. Knight, at 716 (citing Southwest Key Program, Inc. v. Gil-Perez, 81 S.W.3d 269, 271
(Tex. 2002)).
35. Inherent risks are risks that are either integral to the sport or risks that simply exist, for
example falling rocks, etc. Catherine Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries and Inherent
Risks: Wyoming's Recreational Safety Act-An Update, 33 LAND & WATER L. REv. 249, at
§ V(B) (1998). Knight, 834 P.2d at 708(stating that the careless conduct of others can be
an inherent risk, for example a player being hit by a carelessly thrown baseball).
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the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. In other words, the judge is
right back at cornmon law primary implied assumption of risk.
II. PRIMARY IMPLIED ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Assumption of risk is a complicated concept because courts have
used the term in different situations using various analytical
concepts. 36 The Restatement Second of Torts describes at least four
different ways the doctrine is used. 37 However, in general, assumption
of risk occurs when the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly assumes
responsibility for any mishaps resulting from the activity he or she is
engaged in at the time of the injury. Assumption of risk is expressed
or implied. Express assumption of risk means the plaintiff expressly
agrees not to hold the defendant responsible in the event of an injury.38
For example, a defendant may ask plaintiff to sign a consent form or
waiver. Implied assumption of risk occurs when, based on the
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff tacitly
agrees to assume a known risk and thus relieves the defendant from
liability.39 An example is sports and recreational activities which
involve some risks that cannot be eliminated with reasonable care. 40
36. See, e.g. 57A AM. JUR. 20 Negligence et seq. (2004).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. c(l)-c(4) (1965).
c I. In its simplest fonn, assumption of risk means that the plaintiff has
given his express consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation to
exercise care for his protection, and agrees to take his chances as to injury
fonna known or possible risk. The result is that the defendant, who would
otherwise be under a duty to exercise such care, is relieved of that
responsibility, and is no longer under any duty to protect the plaintiff.
c2. A second, and closely related, meaning is that the plaintiff has
entered voluntarily into some relation with the defendant which he knows
to involve risk, and so is regarded as tacitly or impliedly agreeing to
relieve the defendant of responsibility, and to take his own chances ...
c3. In a third type of situation the plaintiff, aware of a risk created by
the negligence of the defendant, proceeds or continues voluntarily to
encounter it. ..
c4 .... The plaintiffs conduct in voluntarily encountering a known
risk is itself unreasonable, and amounts to contributory negligence. There
is thus negligence on both plaintiff and defendant, and plaintiff is barred
from recovery, not only by his implied consent to accept the risk, but also
by the policy of the law which refuses to allow him to impose upon the
defendant a loss for which his own negligence was in part responsible.
38. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6 at § 9.02. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 496B cmt. B (1965) (stating that assumption of risk is usually written, however, other
fonns of consent may be sufficient).
39. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6 at § 9.01; see also Drago, supra note 31.
40. Drago, supra note 31.
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Therefore, courts in comparative negligence states began to reinstate
the defense of implied assumption of risk by dividing it further into
two subcategories: primary implied assumption of risk and secondary
implied assumption ofrisk. 41
Under the doctrine of primary implied assumption of risk, a defendant
does not have a duty to the Elaintiff. Therefore, the defendant's
Thus, it survives comparative
negligence is not examined. 2
negligence and remains a complete bar to a lawsuit. 43 The defendant
merely has a limited duty towards the plaintiff to not increase the
inherent risks of the sport. 44 The public policy behind this concept is
recognition of inherent risks 45 and the important role recreational
activities play in society.46 For example, moguls on a ski slope pose a
unique risk of injury to skiers that would not exist if they were
removed. However, the risks posed by the moguls are part of the sport
of skiing and the ski resort operators have no duty to remove them. 47
So even if a novice skier, with no knowledge or appreciation of the
risk of moguls, becomes injured as a result of skiing over them, the ski
resort operators are not liable. 48 In this regard, an analysis of primary
implied assumption of risk will be unique to every sport or
recreational activity49 allowing for flexibility as new sports and
activities evolve.
Secondary implied assumption of risk occurs when the defendant
has a duty to the plaintiff but the plaintiff acts unreasonably in
voluntarily accepting the risk created by the defendant's breach of that
dUty.50 Therefore, the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct constitutes
41. Kelly, 155 Md. at 95,841 A.2d at 876; Crews v. Hollenbach, 358 Md. 627, 641, 751
A.2d 481, 488 (2000) (stating Maryland has not adopted this distinction). Some courts
call this reasonable primary implied assumption of risk, or no-duty rule, and
unreasonable (secondary) implied assumption of risk. Knight, 834 P.2d at 703
(distinguishing between unreasonablelreasonab1e and primary/secondary); Turcotte, 502
N.E.2d at 968. However, some courts refer to express assumption of risk as primary
assumption of risk. This is possibly because express assumption of risk involves analysis
of whether the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff. Knight, 834 P.2d at 703.
42. Kelly, 155 Md. at 95, 841 A.2d at 876; Turcotte, 502 N.E.2d at 968; Mark W. Milam,
Assumption of Risk in Tennessee Subsequent to the Adoption of Comparative Fault:
Perez v. McConkey, 60 TENN. L. REv. 1007, 1012 (Summer 1993).
43. Id.; Crews, 358 Md. at 640, 751 A.2d at 488.
44. See Kelly, 155 Md. at 104, 841 A.2d at 882.
45. Id. (identifying inherent risks as those that are integral to the sport, game, or recreational
activity).
46. Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 607 (N.J. 1994).
47. Knight, 834 P.2d at 708.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Kelly, 155 Md. at 95, 841 A.2d at 876; see also Crews, 358 Md. at 641, 751 A.2d at 488.
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contributory negligence. 5 ! In a comparative fault regime, this does not
survive as a complete defense. 52 Instead, the plaintiff s conduct is
submitted to the jury for consideration in reducing damages incurred
from the defendant's breach. 53
A.

Equine Activity Statutes

Equine activity statutes first emerged in the late 1980's, at a time
when the question of whether assumption of risk as a defense was still
being settled. 54 Economic factors appear to have been one of the main
motivations behind high risk sport statutes. 55 As more and more states
adopted these statutes, there may have been a stabilizing affect on
insurance costs. Across the nation, insurance rates are determined by
nationwide averages and cost calculations. 56 Under these
circumstances the statutes make sense, as the real value was to clearly
broadcast that personal responsibility was a cannon that had not been
marginalized.
Given the rise in states choosing comparative
negligence fault systems and the fact that insurance rates were at an all
time high with implied assumption of risk non-existent, the statutes
circumvented the confusion over assumption of risk. 57 Having equine
statutes in place would have helped the professional horseman at the
time.
However, the protection provided to horse communities from
equine statutes is somewhat variable. The language of each statute has
an impact on the scope of immunity provided. Therefore, a defendant
horseman goes to trial if the judge determines that the equine statute
does not apply to him or her. For instance, some equine statutes

Drago, supra note 31 at 604-05.
Id.
Id.
See id. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 4.24.540.
See, e.g. supra note 35 at 251.
E-mail from Christopher Heavrin, Agricultural Underwriter, AFIS to Jennifer Merryman
(April 20, 200611:12 A.M. EST) (on file with author).
57 All states have comparative negligence fault systems except Alabama, District of
Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia. Ala. Power Co. v. Schultz, 215
So.2d 447, 452 (Ala. 1968); Wingfield v. People's Drug Store, 379 A.2d 685, 687 (D.C.
1994); Bd. of County Comm'r of Garrett County v. Bell Atl., 346 Md. 160, 180, 695
A.2d 171, 181 (1997); Baskett v. Banks, 45 S.E.2d 173, 177 (Va. 1947). See ALA. TORT
LAW, § 2.01 (Matthew Bender & Co. Inc., 2004); MD. TORT LAW HANDBOOK, supra note
16 at § 11.4; N.C. LAW OF TORTS, § 16 (Matthew Bender & Co. Inc., 2004); PERSONAL
INJURY LAW IN VA., § 5.1.1 (Matthew Bender & Co. Inc., 2004); D.C. CN. JURY INSTR. §
5.15 (2004).

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56
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preclude spectators of equine events from bringing forth a lawsuit for
personal injuries sustained by a horse, while others do not. 58
Under primary implied assumption of risk, it is not necessary to
foresee the specific risk that a spectator or participant may encounter
at an equine event. Instead, it is only necessary for the judge to
decide, based on the facts, if the risk was inherent to being in close
proximity to horses.
The scope of protection provided by statute versus that provided by
common law is illustrated in Freidli v. Kerr. 59 The plaintiffs were
passengers in a horse drawn carriage. 60 The horse spooked from a
loud noise and eventually broke free from the carriage despite the
coachman's efforts. 61 As a result, the carriage overturned injuring the
occupants. 62 The judge determined that the state equine statute did not
provide immunity as a matter of law to the defendant carriage owners
because the passengers were not participants of an equine activity and
the carriage owners were not providers of an equine activity.63
Analyzing the unique facts of this case under primary implied
assumption of risk might yield a different outcome. The judge would
determine if a trained carriage horse which became frightened by a
loud crack or popping noise is a risk inherent in a carriage ride in the
streets of an urban area. If the risk is one that cannot be eliminated
despite reasonable efforts to do so, then the risk is inherent and no
duty exists on behalf of the defendants.
III. MARYLAND LAW
Maryland does not recognize primary implied assumption of risk
because the defense of assumption of risk was never abandoned. 64
Therefore, the cases do not tum on an in depth analysis of the
defendant's duty by the court. Instead, the focus is on whether or not
the plaintiff abandons his or her right to complain through voluntary
exposure to known risks. Additionally, in a common law state, such

58. See, e.g. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 44-20-101 to 44-20-104; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.321(B)(1).
59. Friedli v. Kerr, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (2001).
60. Id. at 1.

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 4-5.
64. MD. TORT LAW HANDBOOK supra note 16 at § 11.6; see, e.g. Kelly, 155 Md. at 93, 841
A.2d at 875.

142

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 36

as Maryland, adopting an equine statute designed to reinstate common
law defenses is unnecessary and a waste of legislative resources.
To date, forty-four other states have passed equine statutes. 65
Interestingly, even though some states have not relinquished the
common law defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk, they nevertheless enacted equine statutes. Alabama, North
Carolina, and Virginia, like Maryland, never adopted a comparative
fault regime. 66 As mentioned previously, one possible explanation for
65. ALA. CODE § 6-5-337 (Westlaw current through End of 2004 First Spec. Sess.); ARIZ.
REV. ANN. § 12-533 (Westlaw current through May 2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-120201 (Westlaw current through November 2004); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-119
(Westlaw current through chapter 153 of the First Reg. Sess. 65th Reg. Sess.); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557p (Westlaw current through Jan. 2005 Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 8140 (Westlaw current through the First Reg. Sess. 2005); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 773.01-.05 (Westlaw current through 2005 First Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. 412-1 (Westlaw current through end of 2004 First Spec. Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. 663B-I
(Westlaw current through 2004 Reg. Sess.); IDAHO CODE 6-1801 (Westlaw current
through 2004 Sess.); 745 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 47/1-47/999 (Westlaw current through
2005 Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. 34-4-44-1 to 34-4-44-12 (Westlaw current through
2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 673.1 (Westlaw current through 2005 First Reg. Sess.); KAN.
STAT. ANN. 60-4001 to 60-4004 (Westlaw current through 2004 Reg. Sess.); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 247.401 (Westlaw current through 2004 Reg. Sess.); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
9:2795.1 (Westlaw current through 2004 First Extraordinary Sess. 2004); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. TIT. 7, 4102-4103 (Westlaw current through 2005 First Reg. Sess.)(noting this
statute has been repealed); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 128, 2D (Westlaw current through
2005 First Annual Sess.); MICH. COMPo LAWS 691.1661 (Westlaw current through 2005);
MINN. STAT. ANN. 604A.12 (Westlaw current through 2005 Reg. Sess.); MISS. CODE
ANN. 95-11-1 to 95-11-7 (Westlaw current through 2004 Third Extraordinary Sess.); Mo.
ANN. STAT. 537.325 (Westlaw current through 2005 First Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN.
27-1-725 to 27-1-727 (Westlaw current 2003 Reg. Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2521,249 (Westlaw current through 2004 Second Reg. Sess.); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
508:19 (Westlaw current through 2004 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:15-1 (Westlaw
current through 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. 42-13-1 to 42-13-5 (Westlaw current through
2005 First Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-I (Westlaw current through 2005 Reg.
Sess.); N.D. CENT CODE 53-10-01 to 53-10-02 (Westlaw current through 2003 Gen &
Special Sess.); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. 2305.321 (Westlaw current through 2005); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 76 § 50.1 (Westlaw current through 2005 Reg. Sess.); OR. REv. STAT.
30.687-.697 (Westlaw current through 2003 Reg. Sess.); R.l. GEN. LAWS 4-21-1 to 4-21-4
(Westlaw current through 2004); S.c. CODE ANN. 47-9-710 (Westlaw current through
2004 Reg. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 42-11-1 to 42-11-5 (Westlaw current
through 2005 Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. 44-20-101 to 44-20-105 (Westlaw current
through 2005 First Reg. Sess.); TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 87.001-.005
(Westlaw current through 2005 Reg. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. 78-27b-101 to 78-27b-102
(Westlaw current through 2004 Gen. Election); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.l2 § 27.1039
(Westlaw current through 2004); Va. Code Ann. 3.1-796.130-.133 (Westlaw current
through 2005 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 4.24.530-.540 (West law current
through 2005); W. VA. CODE 20-4-1 to 20-4-7 (Westlaw current through 2005); WIS.
STAT. ANN. 895.481 (Westlaw current through 2005); WYO. STAT. 1-1-121 to 1-1-123
(Westlaw current through 2004). To date, Maine's equine statute has been repealed.
66. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-337; N.c. GEN. STAT. § 99E-I; VA. CODE ANN. 3.1 796.130-.133
(listing the non-comparative negligence states other than Maryland). Violation of an
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the adoption of equine statutes in these states is the nature of the
insurance industry and how premiums are calculated and determined.
However, that initial stabilization appears to be over. According to
Markel Insurance, the rates in Virginia, North Carolina, and Alabama,
have not been affected by their equine statutes. 67 In fact, the rates in
those states are comparable to the rates Marylanders pay.68 Thus, if
Maryland were to enact an equine statute, the local horse community
could not expect to see a reduction in insurance premiums.
Another reason for equine limited liability statute popularity among
horsemen is the misguided perception that equine statutes afford better
protection than the common law. 69 These statutes are modeled after
the common law, so this belief is simply unfounded. 7o A brief survey
of Maryland law indicates that Maryland's common law provides
ample protection to the local horsemen.
While all equine limited liability statutes are designed to support
the horse community by limiting liability from the inherent risks
associated with horse activities, they are not intended to absolve
defendants from all liability.7] Generally, mishaps that involve non-

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

equine statute may allow a defendant to bring forth the defense of contributory
negligence when the plaintiff's action warrants such a defense. The defense of
contributory negligence may become unavailable when the defendant has violated a
statute when the statute expressly states so or the statute was enacted to protect a specific
class of persons and the legislature intended for the defendant to be responsible. Equine
statutes are directed to the public at large and do not contain this express language and
thus do not fall into one of these exceptions. See also O'Neill v. Windshire-Copeland
Assoc., 595 S.E.2d 281, 284-85 (2004); Brower v. Robert Chappell & Assoc., 328
S.E.2d 45, 47 (1985); Absolon v. Dollahite, 376 Md. 547, 554, 831 A.2d 6, 10
(2003) (stating in Maryland, violation of a statute, even if the language of the statute is
mandatory, is merely evidence of negligence and a defendant may bring forth the defense
of contributory negligence unless the statute expressly states the contrary).
See e-mail from Christopher Heavrin supra note 57.
ld.
Horse lntereste Seek Lawsuit Shield, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, July 28, 1997, at B2
(citing fear of possible lawsuits as another reason for support of the statute).
Krystyna M. Carmal, The Equine Activity Liability Acts: A Discussion of Those in
Existence and Suggestions for a Model Act, 83 Ky. LJ. 157, 166-67 (1994).
See, e.g. TENN. CODE ANN. 44-20-104(b)(I)-(4):
(b) Nothing in 44-20-103 shall prevent or limit the liability of an equine
activity sponsor, an equine professional, or any other person if the equine
activity sponsor, equine professional, or person:
(1) (A) Provided the equipment or tack, and knew or should have known that
the equipment or tack was faulty, and such equipment or tack was faulty to
the extent that it did cause the injury; or
(B) Provided the equine and failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to
determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity
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inherent risks fall outside of the statute. 72 For example, faulty tack or
equipment, failing to supply an appropriate mount (also called
negligent mismatch), intentional torts, and latent defects on the land,
may allow the plaintiff to prevail.
A.

Inherent Risk and Public Policy in Maryland

A recent case illustrates the desire by the Maryland judiciary to
maintain the ability for individuals to continue to pursue and enjoy
sporting activities by ensuring that those who provide for such
opportunities are not unreasonably exposed to litigation. In Kelly v.
Mccarrick, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland decided whether
the Catholic Youth Organization League was negligently responsible
for the severe ankle injury of a thirteen-year-old softball player
sustained in a slide-tagout play.73 The Court opined that a voluntary
participant in a sport assumes all risks that are an integral part of that
sport,74 stating that:
As a matter of policy, it would not be appropriate to
recognize a duty of care when to do so would require
that an integral part of the sport be abandoned, or
would discourage vigorous participation in sporting
events. Accordingly defendants generally do not have a
duty to protect the plaintiff from the risks inherent in
the sport ... 75
B.

Negligently Faulty Tack

Many equine statutes impose a duty on the professional horseman
to supply serviceable tack to a rider. 76 Tack is equipment used in
and detennine the ability of the participant to safely manage the particular
equine based on the participant's representations of the participant's ability;
(2) Owns, leases, rents, or otherwise is in lawful possession and control of the
land or facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries because of a
dangerous latent condition which was known to the equine activity sponsor,
equine professional, or person and for which warning signs have not been
conspicuously posted;
(3) Commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for
the safety of the participant, and that act or omission caused the injury; or
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

(4) Intentionally injures the participant.
/d., Centner, supra note 12 at 1018; Cannal, supra note 73 at 173.
Kelly, 155 Md. at 88-89,841 A.2d at 871-72.
Id. at 96-97,841 A.2d at 877.
Id. 155 Md. at 104,841 A.2d at 882.
See, e.g. TENN. CODE ANN. 44-20-104 (b)(I)(A) (listing non-inherent risks).
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riding horses, such as saddles, bridles, reins etc. The equipment is
usually leather and requires maintenance to prevent dry rot which may
cause the equipment to break while in use. Maryland also recognizes
that this may be a cause of action in negligence. 77 In Pahanish v.
Western Trails, Inc., the plaintiff rented horses from the defendant for
a guided trail ride. 7s During the trail ride, one of the horses kicked the
horse the plaintiff was riding, causing it to rear Up.79 As a result, the
plaintiff and the saddle fell. so One of the arguments advanced by the
plaintiff was negligent faulty equipment. S! Although the Court of
Special Appeals found no direct evidence to show that the defendant
had been alerted to the possibility of a defective saddle, by
implication, when the evidence is such to support a negligent faulty
tack cause of action, a defendant may be liable. 82
C.

Negligent Mismatch

Another exception to many equine statutes is the requirement that a
horse professional make inquiries into the rider's abilities and select an
equine partner that is complimentary.s3 Although there are no cases
on point involving horses, Maryland acknowledges that in sports
generally, part of a coach's or sponsor's responsibilities is not to pit
players of disparate size and skill against each other. 84 This stated
policy, together with the repeated admonishing of other jurisdictions
indicating that the equine provider must act reasonably in selecting a
horse to be ridden, suggests that Maryland law is harmonious with
those states with equine statues that consider negligent mismatching a
non-inherent risk to a rider.

77.
78.
79.
80.
8!.
82.

Pahanish v. Western Trails, Inc., 69 Md. 342, 517 A.2d 1122 (1986).
Id. at 355, 5 I 7 A.2d at 1128.
Id. at351,517 A.2dat 1126.
Id.
Id. at 363, 517 A.2dat 1132.
See Cooperman v. Wyoming Rivers & Trails, 214 F.3d 1162, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000)
(noting the slipping of a saddle due to a loose cinch was an inherent risk of horse back
riding absent evidence to the contrary); Easterling v. English Point Riding Stables, Inc.,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3470, 3-4 (holding that Summary Judgment was not appropriate
because there was an issue of fact regarding whether the martingale used during the
riding lesson broke as a result of it being faulty).
83. Hendricks v. JAFI, Inc., 1999 WL 1336069 (Mass. 1999); Willeck v. Mrotek, Inc., 616
N.W.2d 526, (unreported).
84. Kelly, 155 Md. at 115,841 A.2d at 888.
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D. Landowner Liability
Maryland has long held that landowners have a duty to business
invitees to use ordinary and reasonable care to safely maintain their
premises. 85 However, this is balanced by the idea that landowners are
not insurers of safety to their business invitees. 86 In addition, what is
reasonable and ordinary will differ from circumstance to
circumstance. 87 In Maryland v. Thurston, the plaintiff, a race horse
owner, brought his horse to the track near Fair Hill training complex. 88
While the rider was exercising the horse around the track, it suddenly
veered into a large gap between the rail and the infield of the track. 89
As a result, the horse struck the end of the rail and was impaled by a
metal rod. 9o The Maryland Court of Special Appeals stated the
Department of Natural Resources had an obligation to exercise
ordinary care to maintain the premises and to warn of concealed
dangers that may not be obvious to the business invitee. 91 However, a
forty foot gap in the continuous white rail, directly across the entrance
to the track, was obvious and therefore it was not a latent defect that
required any warning by the landowner. 92

IV. CONCLUSION
The goals of equine statutes are to support the horse industry by
providing a statutory exception to assumption of risk. However, most
jurisdictions currently acknowledge a heightened standard of care with
regard to personal injuries incurred from voluntary participation in
recreational activities and sportS. 93 Additionally, many jurisdictions
also recognize primary implied assumption of risk. It appears that
comparative negligence states are coming full circle back to common
law basic principles, a place Maryland never left. ,Maryland legislators
are to be commended for their interest in meeting the local horse
community's needs. However, the local horse community's efforts
85. MD. TORT LAW HANDBOOK supra note 16 at § 11.3 (stating that the duty a landowner
owes is based on the status of the person entering the landowner's property).
86. Md. State Fair & Agric. Soc'y v. Lee, 29 Md. 374, 378, 348 A.2d 44, 47 (1975).
87. Giant Food, Inc. v. Mitchell, 334 Md. 633, 636, 640 A.2d 1134, 1135 (1994).
88. Maryland v. Thurston, 128 Md. 656, 661, 739 A.2d 940, 943 (1999).
89. Jd. at 660, 739 A.2d at 942.
90. Jd.

91. Id. at 661,739 A.2d at 943.
92. Jd. at 661-62, 739 A.2d at 943.
93. Kelly, 155 Md. at 101,841 A.2d at 880.
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should be refocused from lobbying legislators to enact unnecessary
statutes, to educating the community about the current protections and
responsibilities that stem from the common law. "The best way to
learn the law applicable to specialized endeavors is to study general
rules.,,94 The reality is Maryland's horsemen have nothing to gain
from such a statute, neither a decrease in insurance nor better
protection than the common law already offers.

94. Easterbrook, supra note 11 at 207.

